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Abstract. This paper provides a characterization of Bayes-Nash incen-
tive compatible mechanisms in settings where agents have one-dimensional
or multi-dimensional types, quasi-linear utility functions and interdepen-
dent valuations. The characterization is derived in terms of conditions
for the underlying allocation function.
We do this by making a link to network theory and building complete
directed graphs for agents’ type spaces. We show that an allocation rule
is Bayes-Nash incentive compatible if and only if these graphs have no
negative, finite cycles.
In the case of one-dimensional types and given certain properties for
agents’ valuation functions, we show that this condition reduces to the
absence of negative 2-cycles. In the case of multi-dimensional types and
given a linearity requirement on the valuation functions, we show that
this condition reduces to the absence of negative 2-cycles and an inte-
gratebility condition on the valuation functions.
Keywords. Implementation, Mechanism Design, Multi-Dimensional Types
1 Introduction
This paper is concerned with the characterization of Bayes-Nash incentive com-
patible mechanisms in social choice settings where agents have independently
distributed, one-dimensional or multi-dimensional types and quasi-linear utility
functions, i.e. utility is the valuation of an allocation minus a payment. We allow
for interdependent valuations across agents.
We consider direct revelation mechanisms (DRM). Direct mechanisms con-
sist of two rules: an allocation rule and a payment rule. There are examples in
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the literature offering characterizations of incentive compatible mechanisms in
terms of a monotonicity condition on the allocation function, see for example
Bikhchandani, Chatterji & Sen [1], Gui, Mu¨ller & Vohra [2] for dominant strategy
incentive compatibility and Myerson [3] for Bayes-Nash incentive compatibility.
Similar to Gui, Mu¨ller & Vohra [2] we are making a link to network theory. If
an allocation rule is Bayes-Nash incentive compatible then an agent’s expected
utility for truthfully reporting type t is at least as high as his expected utility for
misreporting type s. We also have that an agent’s expected utility for truthfully
reporting type s is at least as high as his expected utility for misreporting type
t. Taking together these two conditions we get the so-called 2-cycle inequality.
It expresses that the expected difference in valuation for truthfully reporting t
instead of misreporting s should be at least as big as the expected difference in
valuation for misreporting t instead of truthfully reporting s. That the 2-cycle
inequality holds is a necessary condition for Bayes-Nash incentive compatibility.
Recognizing that the constraints inherent in the definition of Bayes-Nash
incentive compatibility have a natural network interpretation we build complete
directed graphs for agents’ type spaces. To do so we associate a node with each
type and put a directed edge between each ordered pair of nodes. The length of
the edge going from the node associated with type s to the node associated with
the type t is defined as the cost of manipulation, i.e. the expected difference in
an agent’s valuation for truthfully reporting t instead of misreporting s. That
the 2-cycle inequality holds translates into the absence of negative 2-cycles in
these graphs.
We show that an allocation function is Bayes-Nash incentive compatible if
and only if these graphs have no negative, finite cycles. In the case of one-
dimensional types and given certain properties for agents’ valuation functions,
we show that this condition reduces to the absence of negative 2-cycles. As an
example we can consider the setup of Myerson [3] and derive as a corollary his
characterization for Bayes-Nash incentive compatibility which requires mono-
tonicity for the expected conditional probability that an agent gets the item.
In the case of multi-dimensional types and given a linearity condition on
the valuation functions, we show that the absence of negative, finite cycles can
be reduced to the absence of negative 2-cycles and an integratebility condition
on the valuation function. As examples we can look at the single item case with
externalities considered by Jehiel, Moldovanu & Stacchetti [4] and the multi-item
case considered by Jehiel & Moldovanu [5] and derive their characterizations for
Bayes-Nash incentive compatibility as corollaries.
Note that this preliminary draft only contains some results and their proofs.
The final paper will include the aforementioned examples, some further results
for the multi-dimensional setting and a more elaborate discussion of how the
contents of this paper relate to the existing literature.
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2 Notation
We have a set of agents N = {1, . . . , n}. Each agent i has a type ti ∈ T i with
T i ⊆ IRk. T denotes the set of all type profiles t = (t1, . . . , tn), and T−i denotes
the set of all type profiles t−i =
(
t1, . . . , ti−1, ti+1, . . . , tn
)
. A payment rule is
a function
P : T 7→ IRn,
so given a report r−i of the others, reporting a type ri results in a payment
Pi
(
ri, r−i
)
for agent i. Denoting the set of outcomes by Γ , an allocation rule
is a function
f : T 7→ Γ.
We allow for interdependent valuations across agents, i.e. agents’ valuations do
not only depend on their own types but on the types of all agents. As an example
one can think of an auction for a painting (see Klemperer [6]) where agents’ types
reflect how much they like the painting. Here an agent’s valuation for owning
the painting can depend on the types of the others as the possible resale value
and the owner’s prestige are affected by them.
Take agent i having true type ti and reporting ri while the others have true
types t−i and report r−i. The value that agent i assigns to the resulting allocation
is denoted by vi
(
f
(
ri, r−i
) | ti, t−i). We assume that valuations are bounded.
Furthermore, we assume quasi-linear utilities, i.e. utility is the valuation of an
allocation minus the payment. We assume that agents’ types are independently
distributed. Let pii
(
ti
)
denote the density on T i. The joint density on T−i is
then given by
pi−i
(
t−i
)
=
∏
j∈N
j 6=i
pij
(
tj
)
.
Assume that agent i believes all other agents to report truthfully. If agent i has
true type ti, then his expected utility for making a report ri is given by1
U i(ri | ti) =
∫
T−i
(
vi
(
f
(
ri, t−i
) | ti, t−i)− Pi (ri, t−i))pi−i (t−i) dt−i
= E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
ri, t−i
) | ti, t−i)− Pi (ri, t−i)] . (1)
An allocation rule f is Bayes-Nash incentive compatible if there exists a
payment rule P such that ∀i ∈ N and ∀ri, r˜i ∈ T i:
E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
ri, t−i
) | ri, t−i)− Pi (ri, t−i)]
≥ E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
r˜i, t−i
) | ri, t−i)− Pi (r˜i, t−i)] . (2)
The constraints of (2) imply that also
E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
r˜i, t−i
) | r˜i, t−i)− Pi (r˜i, t−i)]
≥ E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
ri, t−i
) | r˜i, t−i)− Pi (ri, t−i)] . (3)
1 The definition of the utility in (1) is only given for the continuous case. In the discrete
case the integral is replaced with a sum.
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By adding (2) and (3) we get the 2-cycle inequality2
E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
ri, t−i
) | ri, t−i)− vi (f (r˜i, t−i) | ri, t−i)]
≥ E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
ri, t−i
) | r˜i, t−i)− vi (f (r˜i, t−i) | r˜i, t−i)] . (4)
That the 2-cycle inequality holds for every pair ri, r˜i ∈ T i is a necessary condition
for Bayes-Nash incentive compatibility.
3 The Network
In order to see that the constraints in (2) have a natural network interpretation
it is useful to rewrite (2) as follows:
E−i
[
Pi
(
ri, t−i
)− Pi (r˜i, t−i)]
≤ E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
ri, t−i
) | ri, t−i)− vi (f (r˜i, t−i) | ri, t−i)] . (5)
For each agent we build a complete directed graph T if . A node is associated
with each type and a directed edge is put between each ordered pair of nodes.
For agent i the length of an edge directed from r˜i to ri is denoted li(r˜i, ri) and
defined as the cost of manipulation:
li
(
r˜i, ri
)
= E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
ri, t−i
) | ri, t−i)− vi (f (r˜i, t−i) | ri, t−i)] . (6)
Symmetrically, we associate an edge directed from ri to r˜i with length
li
(
ri, r˜i
)
= E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
r˜i, t−i
) | r˜i, t−i)− vi (f (ri, t−i) | r˜i, t−i)] .
Notice that the 2-cycle inequality can be written as
li
(
r˜i, ri
)
+ li
(
ri, r˜i
) ≥ 0 ∀r˜i, ri ∈ T i.
Theorem 1 An allocation rule f is Bayes-Nash incentive compatible if and only
if ∀i ∈ N , T if has no negative, finite cycle.
Proof(Adapted from Rochet [7].)
First let us assume that f is Bayes-Nash incentive compatible. Take some agent
i and let C =
{
ri1, . . . , r
i
m, r
i
m+1 = r
i
1
}
denote a finite cycle in T if . Using (5) and
(6) we get that ∀j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}
E−i
[
Pi
(
rij+1, t
−i)− Pi (rij , t−i)] ≤ li (rij , rij+1) .
Adding up these inequalities yields
0 ≤
m∑
j=1
li
(
rij , r
i
j+1
)
,
2 Expected payments can be cancelled since we work under the assumption of inde-
pendently distributed types.
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so C has non-negative length.
Conversely, let us assume that there exists no negative, finite cycle in T if ,
∀i ∈ N . For each agent i we pick an arbitrary source node ri1 ∈ T if and define
∀ri ∈ T if
pi
(
ri
)
= inf
m∑
j=1
li
(
rij , r
i
j+1
)
, (7)
where the infimum is taken over all finite paths from ri1 to r
i
m+1 = r
i. Note that
we allow for the empty path. Absence of a negative, finite cycle implies that
pi
(
ri1
)
= 0. Furthermore, ∀ri ∈ T if we have
pi
(
ri1
) ≤ pi (ri)+ li (ri, ri1)
which implies that pi
(
ri
)
is finite. We also have for every pair r˜i, ri ∈ T if
pi
(
ri
) ≤ pi (r˜i)+ li (r˜i, ri) .
Thus, by setting3 Pi
(
ri, t−i
)
= pi
(
ri
)
, ∀t−i ∈ T−i we get
E−i
[
Pi
(
ri, t−i
)− Pi (r˜i, t−i)]
≤ E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
ri, t−i
) | ri, t−i)− vi (f (r˜i, t−i) | ri, t−i)] .
¤
4 One-Dimensional Types
In the one-dimensional case we have T i ⊆ IR. Now, let us introduce the following
condition for the costs of manipulation:
Definition 1 The costs of manipulation are decomposition monotone if
∀ri, r¯i ∈ T i and ∀ri ∈ T i such that ri = ri + α (r¯i − ri),α ∈ (0, 1) we have that
li
(
ri, r¯i
) ≥ li (ri, ri)+ li (ri, r¯i) .
Theorem 2 Suppose that the costs of manipulation are decomposition mono-
tone, then:
For all i ∈ N , T if has no negative, finite cycle if and only if T if has no negative
2-cycle.
Proof
Necessity of the absence of negative 2-cycles follows trivially. For the other
direction let us assume that there is no negative 2-cycle in T if , ∀i ∈ N . Let
3 Note that we could also set E−i
[
Pi
(
ri, t−i
)]
= pi
(
ri
)
+ c which would allow for a
variety of payment rules that yield the same expected payments up to an additive
constant.
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C =
{
ri1, . . . , r
i
m, r
i
m+1 = r
i
1
}
denote a finite cycle in T if . Whenever an edge of C
connects two non-neighboring nodes, we substitute this edge with a path con-
necting the same two nodes via edges that have the same direction and only
connect neighboring nodes. By doing this we generate a new cycle C˜ that has
the same nodes as C but consists only of edges between neighboring nodes, see
for example Figure 1. The edge lengths satisfying decomposition monotonicity
Fig. 1. Example for cycles C (left) and C˜ (right).
implies that the cycle length of C is larger or equal than the length of C˜. Since
C˜ is a cycle, we know that at each node the number of edges entering equals the
number of edges leaving. This implies that the length of C˜ can be written as the
sum of lengths of 2-cycles. Since there are no negative 2-cycles, it follows that
C has non-negative length.
¤
An instance of the costs of manipulation are decomposition monotone is the
case where the valuation function satisfies the following condition:
Definition 2 Take ri, r˜i, ti, t˜i ∈ T i such that
E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
ri, t−i
) | ti, t−i)− vi (f (r˜i, t−i) | ti, t−i)]
≥ E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
ri, t−i
) | t˜i, t−i)− vi (f (r˜i, t−i) | t˜i, t−i)] .
The valuation function satisfies increasing expected differences if ∀t¯i ∈ T i
s.t. t¯i = t˜i + α
(
ti − t˜i) , α > 1 it holds that
E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
ri, t−i
) | t¯i, t−i)− vi (f (r˜i, t−i) | t¯i, t−i)]
≥ E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
ri, t−i
) | ti, t−i)− vi (f (r˜i, t−i) | ti, t−i)] .
In this condition we are dealing with the marginal change in expected valuation
with respect to the report. Consider the change in expected valuation for making
a report ri instead of r˜i. Assume that there exist types ti and t˜i such that this
change is larger or at least as large if the agent has true type ti instead of t˜i.
Then we require that for all types which are even farther away from t˜i than ti
(in the direction of ti) the change in expected valuation is at least as large as
for ti. This requirement is comparable to the condition known as increasing (or
isotone) differences which asserts that the marginal change in valuation with
respect to the allocation is increasing in the type.
Corollary 1 Suppose that the valuation function satisfies increasing expected
differences, then:
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For all i ∈ N , T if has no negative, finite cycle if and only if T if has no negative
2-cycle.
Proof
Necessity of the absence of negative 2-cycles follows trivially. For the other di-
rection let us assume that there is no negative 2-cycle in T if , ∀i ∈ N . Take any
edge from T if and denote its starting node r
i and its ending node r¯i. Suppose
that there exists a ri ∈ T i such that ri = ri +α (r¯i − ri), α ∈ (0, 1). Absence of
negative 2-cycles implies
E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
ri, t−i
) | ri, t−i)− vi (f (ri, t−i) | ri, t−i)]
≥ E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
ri, t−i
) | ri, t−i)− vi (f (ri, t−i) | ri, t−i)] .
Since the valuation function satisfies increasing expected differences we have that
E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
ri, t−i
) | r¯i, t−i)− vi (f (ri, t−i) | r¯i, t−i)]
≥ E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
ri, t−i
) | ri, t−i)− vi (f (ri, t−i) | ri, t−i)] .
Adding on both sides of the inequality yields
E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
ri, t−i
) | r¯i, t−i)− vi (f (ri, t−i) | r¯i, t−i)]
+E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
r¯i, t−i
) | r¯i, t−i)− vi (f (ri, t−i) | r¯i, t−i)]
≥ E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
ri, t−i
) | ri, t−i)− vi (f (ri, t−i) | ri, t−i)]
+E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
r¯i, t−i
) | r¯i, t−i)− vi (f (ri, t−i) | r¯i, t−i)] .
Notice that the first and the last term on the lefthand side of the inequality
cancel, hence
E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
r¯i, t−i
) | r¯i, t−i)− vi (f (ri, t−i) | r¯i, t−i)]
≥ E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
ri, t−i
) | ri, t−i)− vi (f (ri, t−i) | ri, t−i)]
+E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
r¯i, t−i
) | r¯i, t−i)− vi (f (ri, t−i) | r¯i, t−i)] ,
which can be written as
li
(
ri, r¯i
) ≥ li (ri, ri)+ li (ri, r¯i) .
So the costs of manipulation are decomposition monotone. The rest follows from
the proof of Theorem 2.
¤
5 Multi-Dimensional Types
In the multi-dimensional case we have T i ⊆ IRk.4 We assume that all the T i
are convex. Furthermore, we now assume that an agent’s valuation function is
4 For the special case where the T i are only lines in IRk the results of the foregoing
section go through unchanged.
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linear in his own true type. So if agent i has true type ti and reports ri while the
others have true types t−i and report r−i then we can write agent i’s valuation
for the resulting allocation as
vi
(
f
(
ri, r−i
) | ti, t−i) = αi (f (ri, r−i) | t−i)+ βi (f (ri, r−i) | t−i) ti.
Note that αi : Γ × T−i 7→ IR and βi : Γ × T−i 7→ IRk, i.e. αi assigns to every(
γ, t−i
) ∈ Γ ×T−i a point in IR, whereas βi assigns to every (γ, t−i) ∈ Γ ×T−i
a point in IRk. Similarly, assuming agent i believes all other agents to report
truthfully, we can write his expected valuation for reporting ri while having true
type ti as
E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
ri, t−i
) | ti, t−i)]
= E−i
[
αi
(
f
(
ri, t−i
) | t−i)]+ E−i [βi (f (ri, t−i) | t−i)] ti. (8)
Notice that such a linear valuation function satisfies increasing expected differ-
ences, see Definition 2. Also due to the linearity of the valuation function we
have that
∂E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
ri, t−i
) | ti, t−i)]
∂ti
|ti=ri = E−i
[
βi
(
f
(
ri, t−i
) | t−i)] (9)
which is a vector field T i 7→ IRk. A function ϕ: T i 7→ IR is called a potential
function for a vector field ψ: T i 7→ IRk if for any smooth path A joining
ti, t¯i ∈ T i ∫
A
ψ = ϕ
(
t¯i
)− ϕ (ti) .
Theorem 3 Suppose that ∀i ∈ N , T i is convex and that agents have valuation
functions that are linear w.r.t. their own true types then:
For all i ∈ N , T if has no negative, finite cycle if and only if
1) T if has no negative 2-cycle and
2) E−i
[
βi
(
f
(
ri, t−i
) | t−i)] has a potential function.
Proof
First let us assume that T if has no negative, finite cycle. Necessity of the absence
of negative 2-cycles follows trivially. Let C =
{
ri1, . . . , r
i
m, r
i
m+1 = r
i
1
}
denote a
finite cycle in T if . Absence of negative, finite cycles implies that
m∑
j=1
li
(
rij , r
i
j+1
) ≥ 0
which can be rewritten using (6) and (8) as
m∑
j=1
E−i
[
βi
(
f
(
rij+1, t
−i) | t−i)− βi (f (rij , t−i) | t−i)] rij+1 ≥ 0.
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This implies that
m∑
j=1
E−i
[
βi
(
f
(
rij , t
−i) | t−i)] (rij+1 − rij) ≤ 0.
Thus, E−i
[
βi
(
f
(
ri, t−i
) | t−i)] is cyclically monotone (see Rockafellar [8], p.238).
This implies that there exists a convex function ϕ: T i 7→ IR such that E−i
[
βi
(
f
(
ri, t−i
) | t−i)]
is a selection from its subdifferential mapping, i.e.
E−i
[
βi
(
f
(
ri, t−i
) | t−i)] ∈ ∂ϕ (ri) , ∀ri ∈ T i,
(see Rockafellar [8], Theorem 24.8). Furthermore, for any smooth path A joining
ri, r¯i ∈ T if we have that∫
A
E−i
[
βi
(
f
(
ri, t−i
) | t−i)] = ϕ (r¯i)− ϕ (ri) ,
(see Krishna & Maenner [9], Theorem 1). So ϕ is a potential function for
E−i
[
βi
(
f
(
ri, t−i
) | t−i)].
For the converse let us assume ∀i ∈ N that there is no negative 2-cycle in T if
and that E−i
[
βi
(
f
(
ri, t−i
) | t−i)] has a potential function. Take any edge from
T if and denote its starting node r
i and its ending node r¯i. Let A denote the line
segment between ri and r¯i, i.e. A =
{
ri ∈ T i | ri = ri + α (r¯i − ri) , α ∈ [0, 1]}.
Now we substitute li
(
ri, r¯i
)
with li
(
ri, ri
)
+ li
(
ri, r¯i
)
, where ri ∈ A with α ∈
(0, 1). As mentioned above the valuation function satisfies increasing expected
differences. Together with the absence of negative 2-cycles this implies that
li
(
ri, r¯i
) ≥ li (ri, ri)+ li (ri, r¯i) , (10)
which can be shown in the same way as in the proof of Corollary 1. By repeated
substitution we generate a path A˜ =
{
ri1 = r
i, . . . , rim, r
i
m+1 = r¯
i
}
, rij ∈ A, ∀j ∈
{1, . . . ,m+1}. Then (10) implies that the original edge is at least as long as A˜,
i.e.
li
(
ri, r¯i
) ≥ m∑
j=1
li
(
rij , r
i
j+1
)
.
Using (6) we can write
m∑
j=1
li
(
rij , r
i
j+1
)
=
m∑
j=1
E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
rij+1, t
−i) | rij+1, t−i)− vi (f (rij , t−i) | rij+1, t−i)]
= E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
r¯i, t−i
) | r¯i, t−i)− vi (f (ri, t−i) | ri, t−i)]
−
m∑
j=1
E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
rij , t
−i) | rij+1, t−i)− vi (f (rij , t−i) | rij , t−i)] .
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By repeated substitution we can generate paths with more and more edges. In
the limit the distance between neighboring nodes goes to zero. Therefore, by
using (9), we have that the length of A˜ goes to
E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
r¯i, t−i
) | r¯i, t−i)− vi (f (ri, t−i) | ri, t−i)]−∫
A
E−i
[
βi
(
f
(
ri, t−i
) | t−i)] ,
as m → ∞. Since E−i
[
βi
(
f
(
ri, t−i
) | t−i)] has a potential function we can
write ∫
A
E−i
[
βi
(
f
(
ri, t−i
) | t−i)] = ϕ (r¯i)− ϕ (ri) ,
where ϕ denotes the potential function. Thus, it follows that
li
(
ri, r¯i
)
≥ E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
r¯i, t−i
) | r¯i, t−i)− vi (f (ri, t−i) | ri, t−i)]− ϕ (r¯i)+ ϕ (ri) .
Now, let C =
{
ri1, . . . , r
i
m, r
i
m+1 = r
i
1
}
denote a finite cycle in T if . The result in
(11) implies for the length of C that
m∑
j=1
li
(
rij , r
i
j+1
)
≥
m∑
j=1
E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
rij+1, t
−i) | rij+1, t−i)− vi (f (rij , t−i) | rij , t−i)]− ϕ (rij+1)+ ϕ (rij)
= 0,
so C has non-negative length.
¤
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